电子货币应用现状海外之声货币政策新发展：电子货币与货币政策传导|上海羊羽卓进出口贸易有限公司

海外之声货币政策新发展：电子货币与货币政策传导

导读

近年来，电子货币（e-money）在低收入和新兴市场经济中的快速发展，已成为金融科技创新领域最显著的成果之一。这种以法定货币计价、通过智能手机功能交换的数字货币已在全球范围内得到广泛应用。这一发展引发了政策制定者的关注，尤其是关于电子货币发展对货币政策传导影响的问题。本文深入探讨了核心问题：e-money的增长是否增强或削弱了货币政策的传导效应，并特别关注非银行存款类e-money发行者（EMIs）如移动网络运营商与传统银行的相互作用，以及这种互动对货币政策传导的潜在影响。

首先，非银行机构（如移动网络运营商）作为电子货币发行者（EMIs），在银行体系中或可起到补充作用，或可能替代银行的功能。例如，EMIs能够将之前未纳入银行体系的储户引入，这种与银行的互补性可能导致更强的金融中介和货币政策传导力度。然而，EMIs也可能通过将银行存款转移到非银行金融机构而替代银行，导致金融中介的减弱和货币政策传导力度的下降。因此，e-money的发展对于货币政策传导的影响具有重要但理论上不明确的后果。

其次，本研究通过对21个国家月度和47个国家年度（2001年至2019年）的面板数据分析，采用双向固定效应（two-way fixed effect estimator）和单一处理效应的方法来估计电子货币发展对货币政策传导的因果效应。研究发现电子货币的发展伴随着（i）更强的货币政策传导（通过利率对政策利率的响应性来衡量），（ii）银行存款和信贷的增长，以及（iii）银行间竞争和金融中介效率的提升（通过存贷款利率差来衡量）。这些证据在金融包容性有限的国家尤为明显。

并且，本文详细审视了加纳、肯尼亚、尼日利亚、坦桑尼亚和乌干达等非洲前沿电子货币发展国家的经验。这些案例展示了各国在电子货币监管方面的不同策略，以及这些策略如何影响电子货币与银行业务的互动。这些国家的电子货币监管具有类似的特征：（i）EMIs收集的资金必须存放在银行的信托基金中；（ii）EMIs不允许直接提供贷款，但可以与银行合作提供银行信贷；（iii）大多数EMIs可以为客户的余额支付利息。这些电子货币监管特点表明，EMIs很可能与银行互补，而不是替代银行，从而指向了更强的货币政策传导力度。

此外，在不同监管环境下，电子货币（e-money）对货币政策的传导产生了多样化的影响。一些国家如加纳和坦桑尼亚，监管框架鼓励电子货币与传统银行业务的互补。例如，要求电子货币发行商（EMIs）将资金保存在商业银行中，从而增强了银行的存款和贷款能力，并促进了金融深化。这种互补性帮助拓展了银行系统的覆盖范围，尤其是在金融包容性较低的国家，使得更多之前无法接触到银行服务的人群得以融入金融系统。然而，在其他情况下，尤其是在监管较为宽松的环境中，EMIs可能会与传统银行形成直接竞争，如提供类似银行的服务，甚至可能从银行吸引走存款。并且，监管环境的开放性和灵活性虽有助于促进技术创新和电子货币的发展，但也需要平衡确保用户资金安全和经济的整体稳定。总体来看，监管策略在电子货币发展中起着决定性作用，既影响着其与银行业务的互动，也决定了其对金融包容性和系统稳定性的影响。不同国家的经验表明，适当的监管平衡是实现电子货币积极影响的关键因素。

最后，本文对于设计和监管中央银行数字货币（CBDC）和电子货币提供了政策启示。第一，电子货币或CBDC应无需银行账户即可获得，这对于提高电子货币的普及度（金融包容性）至关重要。第二，电子货币监管应鼓励电子货币与银行部门的增长互补性。例如，应将电子货币余额引流至银行并用于贷款。加强信贷登记制度将有助于银行更有效地放贷。第三，应鼓励EMIs与银行合作，向私营部门提供信贷（金融深化），这可以促进两个行业之间的互利关系，促进更广泛的金融获取和深化，同时保障金融部门的稳定性。

综上所述，本文通过实证研究，为理解电子货币发展对货币政策传导影响提供了重要视角。特别是在金融包容性有限的国家，电子货币的发展与更强的货币政策传导力度密切相关。

作者丨Zixuan Huang, Amina Lahreche, Mika Saito, and Ursula Wiriadinata

E-Money and Monetary Policy Transmission

IMF Working Paper

African Department

29 March 2024

Prepared by Zixuan Huang, Amina Lahreche, Mika Saito, and Ursula Wiriadinata

Authorized for distribution by Stephane Roudet

ABSTRACT: E-money development has important yet theoretically ambiguous consequences for monetary policy transmission because nonbank deposit-taking e-money issuers (EMIs) (e.g., mobile network operators) can either complement or substitute banks. Case studies of e-money regulations point to the complementarity of EMIs with banks, implying that the development of e-money could deepen financial intermediation and strengthen monetary policy transmission. The issue is further explored with panel data, on both monthly (covering 21 countries) and annual (covering 47 countries) frequencies, from 2001 to 2019. We use a two-way fixed effect estimator to estimate the causal effects of e-money development on monetary policy transmission. We find that e-money development has accompanied stronger monetary policy transmission (measured by the responsiveness of interest rates to the policy rate), growth in bank deposits and credit, and efficiency gains in financial intermediation (measured by the lending-to-deposit rate spread). Evidence is more pronounced in countries where e-money development takes off in a context of limited financial inclusion. This paper highlights the potential benefits of e-money development in strengthening monetary policy transmission, especially in countries with limited financial inclusion.

Executive Summary

The development of digital currencies is one of the most significant offspring of technological innovations in the financial sector. In many low-income and emerging market economies around the world, digital currencies-denominated in legal tender and exchanged through features of smart phones have gained widespread adoption. This development in turn has raised key questions for policy makers. What is the impact of "e-money" development on monetary policy transmission? What are the implications in designing other digital currencies such as central-bank digital currency (CBC)?

The key question for central banks--whether the growth of e-money enhances or weakens monetary policy transmission is an empirical question because nonbank deposit-taking e-money issuers (EMIs) can either complement or substitute banks. For example, typical EMls such as mobile network operators (MOs) can complement banks by bringing into the banking system previously unbanked depositors. The complementarity of EMIS with banks could lead to higher financial intermediation and stronger monetary policy transmission. EMls can however also substitute banks by moving bank deposits away from banks to nonbank financial institutions. The substitutability of EMIs with banks could lead to financial disintermediation and weaker monetary policy transmission. E-money development therefore could have important, yet theoretically unclear consequences or monetary policy transmission.

Whether EMls can complement, or substitute banks would depend on e-money regulations. Typical features of -money regulations found in Sub-Saharan Africa point to regulators' preference for EMls to complement rather than substitute banks.

We then explore empirically the role of e-money on monetary policy transmission, using panel data covering 21 countries at a monthly frequency, and 47 countries at an annual frequency, for the period between 2001 and 2019. We use a two-way fixed effect estimator with a single treatment to estimate causal effects of e-money development on monetary policy transmission. We find that e-money development has accompanied (i) stronger monetary policy transmission (measured by the responsiveness of interest rates to the policy rate), (ii) growth in bank deposits and credit, and (iii) competition among banks and efficiency gains in financial intermediation (measured by deposit-to-lending rate spreads). Evidence is more pronounced in countries where e-money development takes off in a context of limited financial inclusion. This paper highlights potential benefits of e-money development in strengthening monetary policy transmission, especially in countries with limited financial inclusion.

Introduction

The development of digital currencies is one of the most significant offspring of technological innovations in the financial sector. In many low-income and emerging market economies around the world, digital currencies—denominated in legal tender and exchanged through features of smartphones—have gained widespread adoption. This development in turn has raised key questions for policymakers. What is the impact of 'e-money' development on monetary policy transmission? What are the implications in designing other digital currencies such as central-bank digital currency (CBDC)?

The key question for central banks—whether the growth of e-money enhances or weakens monetary policy transmission—is an empirical question because nonbank deposit-taking e-money issuers (EMIs) can either complement or substitute banks. For example, typical EMIs such as mobile network operators (MNOs) can complement banks by bringing into the banking system previously unbanked depositors. The complementarity of EMIs with banks could lead to higher financial intermediation and stronger monetary policy transmission. EMIs can, however, also substitute banks by moving bank deposits away from banks to nonbank financial institutions. The substitutability of EMIs with banks could lead to financial disintermediation and weaker monetary policy transmission. The development of e-money therefore could have important, yet theoretically unclear, consequences for monetary policy transmission.

Whether EMIs can complement or substitute banks would depend on what EMIs are allowed to do (e.g., offer interest on savings or extend credit). We therefore first review e-money regulations across countries. In this paper, we present case studies of five countries at the frontline of e-money development in Sub-Saharan Africa—Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Uganda. The e-money regulations of these countries share similar features: (i) money collected by EMIs must be maintained in a trust fund in banks; (ii) EMIs are not allowed to extend credit but are allowed to partner with banks to offer bank credit through features of smartphones; and (iii) most EMIs can offer interest on their customers’ balances. Under these features of e-money regulations, EMIs are likely to complement rather than substitute banks. The complementarity of EMIs with banks points to stronger monetary policy transmission."

Empirical Results

This section discusses the relationship between e-money development and monetary policy transmission and the potential underlying mechanisms as laid out in the conceptual framework section.

The Elasticity of Bank Rates with respect to the Policy Rate

Table 3 shows the estimate of equation (1) using the lending rate. The difference between and captures the difference in the elasticity of bank lending rate with respect to the monetary policy rate between two groups of countries with different levels of e-money intensity. A positive difference between and means that e-money development is associated with higher responsiveness of bank lending rate with respect to a change in the monetary policy rate. We observe a positive difference between and with statistical significance but only in the sample of countries with low initial financial inclusion. On average, in the subsample of countries where initial level of financial inclusion is low, e-money development is associated with an increase in the elasticity of the lending rate to the policy rate by 0.3.

Table 4 shows the estimate of equation (1) using the deposit rate. Here we observe a positive difference between and with statistical significance in the full sample as well as the subsample of countries with low initial financial inclusion. On average, in the full and subsample of countries, e-money development is associated with an increase in the elasticity of the deposit rate to the policy rate by about 0.4.

The Lending-to-Deposit Rate Spread and the Deposit Rate

Table 5 shows the estimate of equations (2) and (3), which show the impact of e-money development on the lending-to-deposit rate spread and the deposit rate, respectively. With regards to the spread, a negative coefficient suggests that e-money development is associated with more competition in the banking sector. With regards to the deposit rate, a positive coefficient suggests that e-money development is associated with more competition in the banking sector. On average, in countries with high e-money intensity the deposit rate is 0.81 percentage point higher, and the spread is 0.84 percentage point lower. The results are statistically significant.

Comparing the results of the spread and deposit rates in the subsample of countries, columns (2) and (3), the effect on the deposit rate and spread is more pronounced in countries with low initial financial inclusion. The results are statistically insignificant for countries with higher initial level of financial inclusion. This is consistent with the idea that e-money development brings more competition among banks that used to face limited competition with limited level of financial inclusion.

Bank Deposits and Credit

Tables 6, 7, and 8 show the estimate of equation (4) using total bank credit, credit to the government, and credit to the private sector, respectively. Tables 9, 10, and 11 show the estimate of equation (4) using total deposits, the government deposits, and the private-sector deposits, respectively. These results show that e-money development is significantly associated with growth in both credit and deposits.

Moreover, Tables 7 and 8 show that e-money development leads to a significant expansion to credit to the private sector. No evidence is found for credit to the government. Similarly, Tables 10 and 11 show that e-money development leads to an increase in private-sector deposits, but no evidence is found for the government deposits. This result is intuitive. E-money can channel more currency in circulation into the banking system, either indirectly through MMOs or directly through banks. Both mechanisms are associated with higher private-sector deposits and with higher credit when the deposits are loanable.

Financial Inclusion

Table 12 shows the estimate of equation (5). A positive means e-money development is associated with a higher share of banked population. The estimate of is positive and statistically significant in the full sample and in the subsample of countries with low initial financial inclusion. On average, e-money development is associated with a 4 percent increase in the share of banked population.

As for the dynamic effect, the coefficient is not statistically significant in the year of e-money inception, but it turns statistically significant and larger in magnitude from one-year post inception. This pattern suggests the effect of e-money on financial inclusion is gradual and can take a few years to fully materialize.

编译：浦榕

内容监制：崔洁

来源｜ IMF Working Paper

版面编辑 ｜刘书廷

责任编辑 ｜李锦璇、蒋旭

主编｜朱霜霜

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